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II
STATEMENT D£ THE ISSUES

PDINT I

THE QUESTION OF TAX. COURT JURISDICTION
C D Does UCA 59-24-1, which cereates the Tax Court
Division of the District Courts, grant general
jurisdiction, or only "exclusive Jurisdiction of
all appeals from and petitions for review of
decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered
after formal hearings before the Commission", to
the Tax Court?
C2D When a District Court Judge sits as the
District's "Tax Court Judge", is he limited to the
jurisdictional scope of the "Tax Court" ?
C3D Can the Tax Court, created by UCA 53-24-1,
assume jurisdiction over a case before the State
Tax Commission has conducted "formal hearings",
and "rendered" any decisions pursuant to the
evidence presented at said "formal hearings"?

POINT II

THE QUESTION DF SUMMONS AND SERUICE OF PROCESS
C1D Is a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" a civil
action which requires adherence to the rules of
civil proceedure, particularly rule 4 concerning
process?
(2) Without proper service of process, haw does
the Tax Court gain Jurisdiction over Appellant?
C3D If rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Proceedure does not apply, how can Appellant
object to the sufficiency of service of process?
C4D Is the service of a "notice of hearing"
sufficient as to replace the requirements for a
service of summons ?

POINT H i

THE QUESTION 0£ JEOPARDY PURSUANT TO 53-31 UCA
CI} Is Chapter 31 of Title S3 UCA descriptive of

"jeopardy assessment procedure" or of some other
procedure?
C£) Is the "Writ of Mandate" proceeding, pursuant
to UCA 53-31-7, an unusual kind of special
proceeding in the form of "injunctive relief"? If
so, then is "jeopardy" the special circumstances
under which such an unusual proceeding is
warranted?
C35 Can the "Writ of Mandate", pursuant to 59-31-7
UCA, be used where jeopardy neither exists nor is
alledged?

IHE QUESTION OF

SUFFICIENCY OF EUIDENCE

CI) Did the Respondent present sufficient evidence
to support the allegations proffered in the
"Uerified Petition For Writ of Mandate"?
C£) Can evidence be "assumed", "presumed",
"nonfactual", "hearsay", "probative", "not the
origional", or based upon a "bogus report", or
based upon a "notion" of the State Tax Commission,
and be acceptable as proof of some allegation?
C3) Is the appearance of the Appellant, that is
his clothes and state of health, proof of his
being a "taxpayer" and his having received
"income"?
C4D If Appellant is not a "taxpayer" or the
receipt of "income", does he have a "legal duty"to
file a tax return and can he be "mandated" to do
so?

Ill

STATUTORY PROUISIONS

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:

Title 59, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act
Section 1, Subsection 1:
CDThere is created a tax division in each of the
district courts of the State of Utah which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions
for review of decisions by the state tax commission
rendered after formal hearings before the commission.
Title 59, Chapter 31: Termination and Jeopardy Assessment
Procedure
Section 1, Subsection 1:
CI) If the tax commission finds that a taxpauer intends
quicklu to depart from this state or to remove his
property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his
property therein, or to do any other act (including in
the case of a taxpayer selling or otherwise distributing
all or part of its assets in liquidation or otherwise)
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially
ineffectual proceedings to collect any tax or penalty in
lieu of tax for the current or preceding taxable period,
unless such proceedings be brought without delay the tax
commission may declare the taxable period for such
taxpayer immediately terminated whether or not the time
otherwise allowd by law for filing returns and paying
the liability has expired. The tax commission shall
immediately make a determination of tax for the current
taxable period or for the preceding period, or both, and
not withstanding any other provisions of law, the tax
shall become immediately due and payable. The tax
commission shall immediately assess the amount of the
tax so determined Ctogether with all interest,
penalties, additional amounts and additions to the tax
provided by law) for the current taxable period or such

preceding taxable period, or both, and shall give the
notice of determination and assessment to the taxpayer,
together uiith a demand for immediate payment of the tax.
Section 7, Subsection 1:
CI) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required
pursuant to Title 59 uiithin 50 days of the time
prescribed, the state tax commision may petition for a
writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the
return. The petition may be filed, in the discretion of
the tax commission, in the tax court of the third
judicial district or in the district court for the
county in which the taxpayer resides or has his
principal place of business. In the case of a
nonresident taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the
third district court.
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for
a writ of mandate within EO days after the filing of the
petition or as soon thereafter as the court may
determine, having regard for the rights of the parties
and the necessity of a speedy determination of the
petition.
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within
BO days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the
taxpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall
include an award of attorneys' fees, court costs,
witness fees and all other casts in favor of the
prevailing party.

UTAH RULES OF CIUIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1. GENERAL PRQUISIONS

CA) Scope of rules:
These rules shall govern the procedure in the
Supreme Court, the district courts,city courts, and
justice courts in the State of Utah, in all
actions,suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all statutory
proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be
liberally construed to secure the Just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.

\Jt

RULE 4. PROCESS

Ca) Issuance of Summons.
The summons may be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to
have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified
person for the purpose of sevice. Separate summonses
may be issued and served.
CbD Time of Issuance and Service.
If an action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint, summons must issue thereon within three
months from the date of such filing. The summons must
be served within one year after the filing of the
complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed,
provided that in any action brought against two or more
defendants in which personal service has been obtained
upon one of them within the year, the other or others
may be served or appear any time before trial.
Cc) Contents of Summons.
The summons shall contain the name of the court,
the names or designations of the parties to the action,
the county in which it is brought, be directed to the
defendant, state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall
notify him that in case of his failure to do so,
judgment by default will be rendered against him. If
the summons be served without a copy of the complaint,
or by publication, it shall briefly state the sum of
money or other relief demanded, and in case of
publication of summons such summons as published shall
contain a description of the subject matter or res
involved in the action. Where the summons is served
without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy
of said complaint will be served upon or mailed to
defendant within ten days after such service or that if
the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will
be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days
after such service.
Rule 64A. PREJUDGEMENT WRITS
C5) At the hearing on the issue of the writ or its
continuance, the proponent of the writ shall have the
burden of establishing the facts justifying its issuance
and continuance.

IU
STATEMENT OF. THE. CASE

NATURE Q£ THE CASE
This is a civil case, based on the allegations that the
Appellant is a taxpayer, that he tuas gainfully employed
and/or earned commission income, that he earned and/or
received sufficient "income" during the years 1973, 1980,
1981, and 198E to be required to file federal income tax
returns for those taxable years, that he was required to file
Utah Individual Income Tax Returns for the above mentioned
taxable years, and that he "failed" to file said returns.
Upon these allegations the State Tax Commission (hereinafter
referred to as STC) prayed the court to grant a Writ of
Mandate pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec.
59-31-7C1).
Appellant denied each of the above mentioned
allegations, challenged the jurisdiction of the tax court to
hear this case, and challenged the applicability of Utah Code
Ann. sec. 59-31-7C1) in these

circumstances.
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COURSE DJF THE. PROCEEDINGS

On Nay EQ, 1985 the Appellant was served with a UERIFIED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. sec.
59-31-7ClXRecord pp. E-5) in which the STC proffered the
above mentioned allegations. On June 5, 1985 Appellant filed
a UERIFIED STATEMENT OF REFUTATION, DECLARATION OF STATUS,
AND UERIFIED STATEMENT OF FACTS,in which Appellant: declared
that he is not a corporation, partnership, franchise,
association, trust, employee, employer, or other person of
priviledged status, but rather is simply a free and natural
individual citizen who has no equity contract with the
Federal Government nor the State of Utah by which specific
performance can be compelled; denied each of the above
mentioned allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of the
Tax Court over this matter.
At the initial hearing held June 7, 1985, Appellant
orally challenged the jurisdiction of the

Third District Tax

Court and denied the allegations proffered by the STC. This
placed the burden of proving the Jurisdiction of the Tax
Court, and proving those allegations, upon the STC. They were
unable to present any evidence, acceptable to the court, in
support of their allegations, so the hearing was continued

until July B, 1985
Upon request of the STC for more time for discovery, the
continued hearing scheduled for July B was rescheduled for
August 13, 1985. Dn July 11, 1985, Appellant was served with
a Subpoena Duces Tecum

and a Notice of Taking Deposition and

Request for Production of Documents. Said deposition was
scheduled for July 19,19B5. Appellant responded with a Motion
to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed July IE, 1985 in which
he argued that since the Jurisdiction of the court had been
squarely challenged and a decision an that issue had not yet
been made, there was no authority by which to issue a
subpoena upon Appellant. A motion hearing on this issue was
held on July E£, 19B5 after which the court took the matter
under advisement (transcript p. 80 11. 4-7 8 16-17).
On August 13, 1985, the scheduled continued hearing to
take evidence in support of the STC's allegations was held.
STC's principal objective in this hearing was to get
Appellant on the witness stand and examine him under oath
concerning his alledged income and assets Ctranscript p. 83
11. 14-18}. Appellant attemped to raise another
jurisdictional issue, but was summarily denied and ordered to
come forward to be examined as a witness. After approximately
14 questions were asked and answered, none of which generated
sufficient evidence to support STC's allegations, the court
intervened by declaring that it would issue the Writ of

Mandate and compel Appellant to file tax returns Ctranscript
p. 86 1. 16 through p. SB 1. 16). Court costs and Attorneys'
fees were also awarded to STC.
On August E3, 1985, the Appellant filed a Demand for
Relief from Writ of Mandate and scheduled a hearing for
September 9, 1985 to hear arguments on said Demand.
Appellant's Demand raises the Jurisdictional issue that He
was not allowed to raise in hearing on August 13, namely that
the court lacks jurisdiction because the Appellant was never
served with a summons as required by Rule Ht of the Utah Rules
of Civil Proceedure. STC argues that this Demand is
essentially a rehash of Jurisdictional issues already denyed
by the court and should therefore be denied. Pursuant to the
Memorandum Opinion and Order signed September 19, 1985,
Appellants demand for relief from the Writ of Mandate was
denied, but relief from costs and attorny fees was granted.
The Appellant now brings this appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah from the final order of the Third
District Tax Court Crecord pp. 145-147).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1. Appellant's status is that of a simple individual, as in
free from

complications and combinations, a free and natural

person. Crecord pp. 15&16)

S.

Appellant is not the recipient of any special grant from

the State; that is, he is not a privileged person such as a
firm, partnership, association, corporation, franchise, ect.
Crecord pp. 15&16)

3.

On the 9th of May, 1SB5, this action was commenced when

the State Tax Commission filed a "Uerified Petition for Writ
of Mandate", a "Uerification", and a "Notice of Hearing" in
the Tax Court of the 3rd Judicial District. Crecord pp. £-63

4.

Said Petition was an origional action, not being

supplemental to any other proceedings. Crecord}

5.

On the EOth day of flay, 19B5, an employee of the

State

Tax Commission served a copy of said "Uerified Petition for
Writ of Mandate", a "Uerification", and a "Notice of Hearing"
on Appellant's wife. Crecord p. B)

6.

The determinations upon which STC based their

allegations were made by one tlericia L. Fryer. Ctranscript p.
15 11. 1~11)

7.

The sole basis for said determinations was a document

purported to be a copy of a Federal nonfiling audit.
Ctranscript p. 15 11. 13&14, p. 17 11. 3-10, p. 13 11. 4-1E)

8.

This is the first Writ of Mandate the STC has petitioned

for, based on a "federal nonfiling audit". Ctranscript p. 13
11. 4&5)

3.

The document purported to be a copy of the federal

nonfiling audit was marked as exhibit #1 and offered for
acceptance as evidence. Ctranscript p. 15 1. E5, p. 15 11.
1-5, p. 17 11. 3-13)

10.

Said exhibit #1 was never accepted as evidence, but was

ruled as hearsay. Ctranscript p. IB 11. l&E, p. 13 11. E3--E5,
p. E3 11. 18-E5, p. E5 11. 1-3, p. SB 11. 1B-E5)

11.

The Tax Court has stated that Ms. Fryer, in testimony,

didn't establish any evidence concerning the allegations
except that Appellant had not filed a Utah Individual Tax
Return for the years in question, which appellant admits.
Ctranscript p. 40 11. 10-13)

IE.

No summons, concerning this action, has issued nor been

served upon Appellant. (record)

13.

The "Notice of Hearing", which was served with said

Petition and Uerification, was not addressed to Appellant,
did not state the county in which this action was being
brought, and did not instruct Appellant what he should to
avoid the entry of judgement by default, but only stated the
time, place, and before whom the hearing was to occur.
Crecord p. 7)
14.

At no time has Appellant filed an appeal to the Tax

Court Division of the Third Judicial District, made any
general appearances, general motions, or knowingly taken any
other action which would indicate "voluntary" entrance into
the jurisdiction of the Tax Court of the 3rd Judicial
District, but has always been careful to let the record show
the special nature of each appearance in order to preserve
his challenge to the Tax Court's jurisdiction, (transcript p.
4£ 11. 12-14, p. 73 11. 11-16, p. 97 11. 8-14, record p. IB)

15.

There were no "formal hearings", and no decision was

rendered pursuant to such, concerning this matter from which
an appeal could have been taken to the Tax Court, (transcript
p. 43 1. 18)

IB.

This action was brought pursuant to the provisions of

UCA 59-31-7C1).Crecord p. E)

17.

In instant case, jeopardy was neither alledged nor

proven by STC. Ctranscript & record)

IS.

Appellant did challenge and object to the use of an

"emergency jeopardy" procedure in the absence of emergency or
jeopardy being alledged and proven. Crecord p. 5BS59D
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SUMMARY D£ ARGUMENTS

POINT 1

Appellant argues that the Tax Court of the Third

Judicial District is excluded by statute CUCA 59-E4-l)from
hearing instant case.

POINT 11

Appellant argues that absent "voluntary submission"

or service of summons Cas per rule #4 RCPD the Tax Court can
not obtain jurisdiction over this person.

POINT III Appellant argues that if the "Writ of Mandate",
pursuant to 59-31-7C1D, is an unusual kind of special
proceeding in the form of "injunctive relief" then it should
be used only when the emergency situation of "jeopardy"
warrants such.

POINT IU

Appellant argues that the State Tax Commission

failed to carry its burden of establishing sufficient facts
to justify the issuance of a Writ of Mandate as per Rule
B4AC5D of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure.

u
ARGUMENTS

POINT I

THE. QUESTION OF TAX. COURT JURISDICTION

From the very beginning of this case, Appellant has
challenged the Jurisdiction of the Tax Court of the Third
Judicial District. In the first document filed by Appellant
jurisdiction was challenged Crecord p. 24). At the first
hearing appellant was hesitant to come past the bar, fearing
that such an act would indicate a "voluntary" acceptance of
the Tax Court's jurisdiction, thereby waiving the standing
Jurisdictional challenge Ctranscript p.3 11.6-17).

By U.S.

Supreme Court declaration "once jurisdiction is challenged,
it must be proven."CHagens v Lavine. HIS UDSD 533, note 3)
—for mere "good Faith" assertions of power and authority
have been abolished COwens v Indiana, 445 U.S. 6E2).
The STC submitted the argument that the Tax Cout is a
court of general Jurisdiction and that UCA 59-31-7 gives it
jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandate Crecord p.120) as
proof of its contention that the Tax Court had jurisdiction
over instant case. The Tax Court Judge assumed Jurisdiction,
pursuant to this argument, and moved forward with the case.

Applant's Brief - page 11

Appellant argues that while the District Courts are
indeed courts of general Jurisdiction created by the Utah
Constitution, the Tax Court is not mentioned in the
constitution but is a legislative creation, moreover, UCA
53-31-7 is addressing the State Tax Commission as the subject
to whom power is being granted. No grant of authority is
given to the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District
District Courts in this statute. Said

or the

courts are mentioned

only as the objects of a phrase, not the subject of the
statute.
When the State Legislature authorized the Tax Court it
did so by saying:
There is created a tax division in each of the distrit
courts of the State of Utah which shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions for
review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered
after formal hearings before the commission. C UCA
53-34-1)
By using the adjective "exclusive", the Legislature conveys
their intent that this be a very narrow and specific
Jurisdictional grant. Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary defines "exclusive" as:
1. Excluding all others; shutting out other
considerations, happenings, existences, occupations,
etc.; as, vegetable and mineral are exclusive terms.
2. Having the tendency or power to exclude all others
3. Excluding all but what is specified; as, onlu is an
exclusive particle.
4. Not shared or divided; sole; single; as, an exclusive
right to sell something.

Therefore, by this definition, the Tax Court is only granted
Jurisdiction within a very precise and specific range of
circumstances.
Three distinctly identifiable events must occur leading
up to that Jurisdiction:
1. There must have been a decision rendered by the State
Tax Commission.
£. That decision must have been rendered after formal
hearings before the Commission.
3. An appeal from or a petition for review of decisions
so rendered must be brought to the Tax Court.
If any of these indicia are missing then the issue does not
fall within the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the Tax Court and
must be taken elswhere.
In a recent case concerning property taxation , the
issue of the authority of the Tax Court Division of the
District Courts was raised before this Supreme Court. The
ruling in part read:
The statutory scheme establishing the tax
divisions...provides only that the tax division may
review decisions, determinations, and orders of the Tax
Commission, section 53-E4-3 CSupp. 1383), and may
"affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order of the
state tax commission, and shall grant other relief,
invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in
accordance with its decision, as shall be appropriate."
Section 53-S4-4 CSupp. 1383).
Kennecott v Salt Lake County., E3 UAR, p. 47 Caddendum
#1)
Since UCA 53-84-1 is the only Jurisdictional grant to a "Tax
Court" in all of the Utah Code or the Utah Stat
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The record of instant case shows that although the STC

did make some "determinations"Ctranscript p.15 11.4-113, said
decisions were not rendered after formal hearings because
there were no formal hearing (transcript p.48 11.5-E5 &p. 49
11.1-193 and no appeal or petition for review has been
recorded with the Tax Court on these issues by this
appellant. This case therefore does not fall within the
exclusive Jurisdiction of the Tax Court and cannot be
determined by it.

POINT II

THE. QUESTION OF SUfiriONS AND. SERUICE OF PROCESS

Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure speaks of
the scape of these Rules

and says , in part: "these rules

shall govern the proceedure... in. all actions, suits and
proceedings of a civil nature... and in all special statutoru
proceedings...". Rule 3 of said rules outlines the methods of
commencing such actions, one of which is by the filing of a
complaint with the court. Rule 4Cb) further explains that:
"If an action is commensed by the filing of a complaint,
summons must issue thereon within three months from the date
of such filing...". Rule 4Cc) describes the contents of said
"summons" to be as follows:
The summons shall contain the name of the court, the
names or designations of the parties to the action, the
county in which it is brought, be directed to the
defendent, state the time within which the defendent is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall

App1ant's Brief - page 15
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commencement of the action which confers jurisdic;,cDtherwise, a defendant could never abject to the
sufficiency of survice of process, since he must have
knowledge of the suit to make such objection.. . W: proper
issuance and service of summons is the means c; i-rxri".:;
the Jurisdiction of the ccurt and of acquiring
Jurisdiction over the defendant, th.-se cannot he
supplanted by mere notice by letter * -• • -^phone or any
other such means. (Murdock v. p 1
~ ?d 1R41
CAddendum #3)

With the Court's memory refreshed concerning these
cases, Appellant would like to focus attention on the
circumstances of the case at hand, namely that:
1.

This case was commenced by the filing of a Petition for

Writ of Mandate, which has been construed is a complaint,
with the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District on
May 3,1385. Crecord pp.2-5)
2.

Also filed with said Petition was a "Uerification" and a

"Notice of Hearing". Crecord pp. 6&7)
3.

Said petition and attatched verification and notice of

hearing were served upon Appellant's wife. Crecord p. 3)
4.

No summons has been issued nor served upon respondent in

this case. Crecord)
5.

Said "Notice of Hearing" was not addressed to Appellant,

did not state the county in which this action is being
brought, and did not instruct Appellant what he should do to
avoid the entry of Judgement by default, but simply stated
the time, place, and before whom the hearing was to occur.
Crecord p. 7)
6.

The three months time, allowed by RCP Rule 4Cb) in which

a summons must issue, lapsed on or about August 3, 1335.
7.

Appellant has always been careful that all appearances

and paper were of a "special" nature, challenging
jurisdiction, and not of a "general" nature. Ctranscript p.
42 11. 12-14, p. 73 11. 11-16, p. 37 11. 3-14, record p. 16)
8.

The Judge of the Tax Court Division of the Third

Judicial District decided to issued the Writ of Mandate
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is indeed an "... unusual kind of proceedings..." Ctranscript
p. 103 11. 15&16), then what are the unusual circumstances
which warrent such "unusual proceedings"? Appellant argues
that the circumstances which would Justify a court assuming
Jurisdiction, absent full service of process, would be those
under which the Legislature intended the Writ of Mandate
Pursuant to UCA 59-31-7 to be used, namely leopardu. Thus we
move into the next point.

POINT IXI IHE QUESTION OF JEOPARDY PURSUANT TO 59-31 UCA

To understand the jurisdictional grant afforded through
59-31-7C1) UCA, we must first place this subsection in its
proper context and then examine the exact wording and
definition of those words. UCA Title 59 is designated Revenue
and Taxation, meaning that all chapters, sections, and
subsections, under Title 59 deal with revenue and taxation.
UCA Title 59 Chapter 31 is designated Termination and
leopardu assessments procedure, meaning that all sections and
subsections under this chapter deal with termination and
jeopardy assessment procedure of revenue and taxation. UCA
59-31-7, being a subsection of Chapter 31, Title 59, can only
be applied in cases of termination and jeopardy assessment
proceedings of revenue and taxation, otherwise it is being
applied outside the scope of its statutory application.
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POINT IJJ THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY DF EUIDENCE

The STC Petition for Writ of Mandate, which initiated
instant case, avers basicly the following allegations
concerning Appellant:
1.

Appellant was gainfully employed and/or earned

commission income during the taxable years 1979-198E.
£.

Appellant earned and/or received sufficient income,

during the above-mentioned years, to be required to file
federal income tax returns for said years.
3.

Appellant was required to file utah individual income

tax returns, form TC-40 or the appropriate alternative forms,
for said years.
4.

Appellant has failed to file said forms for the

above-mentioned years.
Appellant in turn , by a document declaring to be a
"special" appearance Crecord pp. 3&4), denied each of the
allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of the Tax Court
to hear this case. Again, at the first hearing held June 7,
1985, Appellant orally denied each of the allegations
proffered, and challenged the Jurisdiction of the court. This
placed the burden of proving said allegations and
Jurisdiction squarely upon the STC. In an attempt to shoulder
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During this first hear J.-- •

it

became obvious Hunt M I M

STC would be counting heavily an Appellant's own testimony to
prove the allegations against him (transcript page 24 lines
7-15, p. 27 11. 5-15, p. 46 11. 3-8, p. 56 11. 5-10). In a
motion hearing, July 22,19B5, Appellant emphaticly stated his
desire not to be a witness against himself:
Let the record show that I, the respondent, do not
intend to be a witness against myself. I demand my
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights at all times, and in
no case will I willingly relinquish them. I intend to
stand upon the Hale v Hinkle doctrine as expressed by
the Supreme Court and I quote: "Ule are of the opinion
that there is a clear distinction between an individual
and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to
refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination
at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon
his constitutional rights as a citizen, and he is
entitled to carry an his private business in his own
way. His powers to contract is unlimited. He owes no
duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his
business or to open his doors to an investigation so far
as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty
to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom,
beyond the protection of his life and property. His
rights as such have existed^ by the law of the land long
antecedent before the organization of the state, and can
only be taken from him by due process of law and in
accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a
right to refuse to incriminate himself, and the
protection of himself and his property from arrest and
seizure except under warrent issued under law, and he
owes nothing to the public as long as he does not
trespass upon their rights." Ctranscript p. 77 1. 17
through p. 78 1. 17, Hale v. Hinke, 201 u.s. 43)

Despite Appellant's demands for his rights to privacy
and against self incrimination, he was ordered, over his
objection, to take the witness stand at the very beginning of
the continued hearing on August 13, 1385 Ctranscript p. 8E5 1.
20 through p. 85A 1. 5 ) . After approximately fourteen
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and c o n t i n u a n c e , (rule 6 4 A 5 , RTF')
A p e r so i l' s appear a i i ce , t J i a t i s h is c1o 11 i e s a n d h is h e a11 ] i,
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CONCLUSION

The statutes and rules as properly applied to the facts
and circumstances of instant case, as outlined in this
Appellant's Brief, prove that the Tax Court improperly
assumed jurisdiction, and errored in the issuance of the Writ
of mandate
Wherefore, Appellant prays this Supreme Court to reverse
the decision of the Tax Court, based on the arguments
contained herein, and award Appellant costs and fees of this
action.

Dated this

day of March, 19B6

Clay K. Iverson
Appellant in Proper Person
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*-:"•; % ith the majority
that exempi
. - . taxation should be
strictly con ufd Ail jurisdictions so
hold. Howcv . wt have also pointed out
that in so c tng we should give a reasonable meaning to the language of the constitutional ex. option and not construe it
so narrowly that no institution can
- qualify, thereby choking off the charitable
enterprises the exemption was meant to
encourage. Benevolent
and
Protective
^-itr of Elks No. 85 v. Tax Commission
Utah, 536 P. 2d 12 4 (1975). The
Suprcme <.oun » • Misw
i^i :j.i- ivrote
this poin*.
'Taxation "
xempuon
therefrom v
^
Claims
for exemptioi
"e nr. ,avored in
the law* However, Missouri has
declared as its public policy that
property actually and regular!)
used exclusively for charitable
purposes shall be exempt from
taxation, and the taxing authorities
are not. to be permitted to defeat
that. announced public policy by
unreasonable or unrealistic application of the 'strict construction*
rule.
Missoui i United Methodist
Retirement
Homes v. State 'Tax Commission, Mo.,
522 S.W.2d 745, 751 (1975) (citation
omitted).
I would uphold the constitutionality o
sections ^59-2-30 and 59-2-31. The over
whelming case law both from this Court
and from other jurisdictions supports the
legislature's determination. Certainly, the
presumption of constitutionality of the
statutes has not been overcome. I would
affirm the decision of the Tax Commission granting an exemption to the two
hospitals. I also concur i- *---f-c
Stewart's dissenting opinion,
Zimmerman, Justice, does not participate herein; Sam, District Judge, sat.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF T H E STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a New
York corporation,
Plaintiff,
r.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et aJ.f
Defendants and Appellants.
Ir
SALT LAKE COUNTY, f! •!
Cross-daimant s inf K p u <"!"' \ • 11 v.
THE STATE TAX COMM1 SSION OF
UTAH, et al„
Cross-defendants.
No. 18972
FILED: June 27, 19S5
THIRD D I S T R I C T Hon. Philip R. Fishier
ATTORNEYS:
Theodore L. Ganno.
omas Peters,
John G. Avery for
Keith E. Taylor, Jt
do, Reed L.
Martineau, Bex K K».,dscn for Respondents.
^ WART, Justice:
s appeal arises from a :hai!engc
Salt Lake County to the Utah State
Commission's methods of valuing mi
properties owned by Kennecott Corjx
ion. On May 19, 1982, Kennecott sued
Tax Commission, the County, and oi
for a partial refund of its 1981 prop:
taxes previously paid under protest. 1
diction was alleged pursuant to U *
1953, section 59-11-11. Kennecott c
ained that U.C.A., 1953, section 59 ;
(repealed 1982 Utah Laws ch. 66, sev'i
6), which reduced, the valuation of re* • :
ntial property by 20%, . was unconsti ,J
onal and that consequently Kennecott's ,.,
burden was unlawfully increased. In K
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, U\*.

F0t,UTAILC»0E ANNOTATIONS, m Ike wtoa-i

KCIIOB
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681 P.2d 184 (1984)/- we upheld the constitutionality of ejection 59-5-4.5, and by
stipulation of the, parties that, issue is no
longer part of this suittr
The County o filed two taross-claims
against the - Tax Xommission and one
counterclaim against ' Kcnnecotfc*>-The first
cross-claim againstvthe Tax* Commission
alleged that U.C.A.* 1953, section 59-557, which governs the assessment-of mines,
mining claims, and mining machinery,
prescribes a method of assessment that
does not reflect the full cash value of
mining property and therefore violates
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. The cross-claim further alleged
that the Tax Commission had failed to
assess certain personal property of
Kennecott at its full cash value and had
erroneously assessed the value of improvements to real property by classifying them
as personal property. The cross-claim
prayed for (1) a declaration that section
59-5-57 was unconstitutional; and (2) an
order directing the Tax Commission to
correct the inequities in its assessment
procedures and assess state-assessed
mining properties at their full cash value,
as required by Article XIII, Section 3.
The second cross-claim against the Tax
Commission alleged that the Tax Commission possessed information of Kennecott's
assessments that Salt Lake County was
entitled to review and prayed for an
order directing the Tax Commission to
make the information available to the
County.
The County's counterclaim against
Kennecott alleged that Kennecott's mining
properties and equipment were undervalued for various reasons 1 and that
therefore the County was entitled to
recover lost taxes from Kennecott for
previous years. It prayed for an order
fixing the full cash value of Kennecott's
properties as of 1981 and for a judgment
for taxes that have escaped assessment
over the past five years.
The district court ruled that the County
lacked standing to maintain its crossclaims against the Tax Commission and its
counterclaim against Kennecott and
therefore dismissed the cross-claims and
counterclaim with prejudice. The County
appeals the dismissal. We reverse and
remand.

CODECO

deralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such/ Association of
Data Processing Service
Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
Nevertheless, in Jenkins v. Swan, Utah,
675 P.2d 1145 (1982), we formulated an
alternative test for determining standing.
1. We first apply traditional standing
criteria, which require that (a) the
interests of the parties be adverse, and
(b) the parties seeking relief have a
legally protectible interest in the controversy. Id. at 1148, 1150. "Plaintiff must be
able to show that he has suffered some
distinct and palpable injury that gives
him a personal stake in the outcome of
the legal dispute." Id. at 1148.
2. If the plaintiff has no standing under
the first step, then he may have standing
if no one has a greater interest than he
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised
at all if the plaintiff is denied standing.
Id. at 1150.
3. In unique cases, standing may be established by a showing that the issues
raised by the plaintiff are of great public
importance and ought to be judicially
resolved. Id. at 1150-51.
In this case, the County satisfies the
first step of the standing test. Under the
current statutory scheme, which was in
effect when Kennecott filed its complaint,
the Tax Commission assesses metalliferous
mines and mining claims, section 59-5-57
(Supp. 1983), and apportions these assessments to the counties and the other taxing
districts in which the mines and mining
claims are situated, section 59-6-1(5)
(Supp. 1983). By May 25th of each year,
the Tax Commission transmits to each
county auditor a statement showing the
assessed value of the state-»assessed properties within the county and the amount
apportioned to the county. Section 59-6-2
(Supp. 1983). By June 1st, each county
must in turn apportion the value of the
state-assessed properties among the
various taxing districts within the county
and transmit statements of those apportionments to the taxing districts. Section 596-3 (Supp. 1983). By June 15th, each
county must set the mill levy on the
taxable property of the county. Section
59-9-6.3 (Supp. 1983). The mill levies are
limited to 16 mills per assessed dollar
valuation in counties with a total assessed
valuation of over $20 million and 18
mills per assessed dollar valuation for
I.
counties
with a total assessed valuation
The major issue in this case is whether
the County has standing to sue the Tax under $20 million. Section 59-9-6 2
Commission and Kennecott. At the (1974). Counties may not incur debt in
outset, we note that standing issues often excess of the taxes for the current year
turn on the facts of a case and that " fe- except by a majority vote of qualified
electors. Utah Const. Article XIV. Section

CODE»CO
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and it cannot be - extended to entities,
such as counties, not fairly within the
statutory provisions a. ILg.,^'State ex rcl.
St. Francois County School District R-III
\. Lalumondicr, Mo.> =(518 S.W.2d 638
(1975); In re Proposed ^Assessment of
County Treasurer, >i2%9 jJawa. 1099, 260
N.W. 538 (1935); Qdgsbyiw. Minnehaha
County, 6 S.D. 492, 62' N.W. 105, 107
(1895). See alsocz&nuot.,
'Who May
Complain of Underassessment or Nonassessment of Property for Taxation," 5 + A.L.R.2d 576 (1949). The rule advanced by
the Tax Commission is consistent with
this Court's decisions. See Pacific Intcrmountain Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957);
Home Fire Insurance Co ^ lynch 10
Utah 189,56 P. 681 (1899).
Nevertheless, the rule relied upon by the
Tax Commission and Kennecott does not
control this case, because it does not
apply to cases wheie a county challenges
not just the validity of a particular assessment, but the constitutionality of the
mining assessment statutes and assessment
methods generally. Clearly, the decision
of assessing authorities is subject to
judicial review when they value property
pursuant to a statute or method claimed
to be unconstitutional, or have otherwise
arted outside their statutory authority.
I hen the overvaluation of property has
arisen from the adoption of a rule of
appraisement which conflicts with a constitutional or statutory direction, and
operates unequally not merely on a single
individual but on a large class of individuals or corporations, a party aggrieved
may resort to a court of equity ... n
Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 11 S
535, 551 (1887); see also 3 T. Cooky,
77ie Law of Taxation section 1201 (1924);
84 C.J.S. Taxation section 561 at 1104-06
(1954); cf. Home Fire Insurance Co v.
Lynch, 19 Utah 189, 56 P. 681 (1899);
Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., Ark.,
119 S.W. 251, 253-54 (1909); White v.
Board of Appeals of Cook County, 45
111, 2d 378, 259 N.E.2d 51, 52-53 (1970);
Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 338, 147
S E.2d 244, 249 (1966). Questions of the
legality or constitutionality of tax statutes
are proper subjects for judicial review.
See Utah Tax Commission v. Wright,
II
'1 lir lax Commission nml Kennecott Utah, 596 P.2d 634 (1979); Shea v. State
in pin that the County lacks standing Tax Commission, 101 Utah ?D9, 1?0 P ?d
lh in use no statute explicitly authorizes the 274(1941).
In Kane County Board of Equalization
County to challenge assessments by the
Tax Commission. They advance a rule v. State Tax Commission, 88 Utah 219,
followed by other courts that the right of 50 P.2d 418 (1935), Kane County petitijudicial review in tax assessment cases is oned for a writ of certiorari to review Tax
h" statute limited to a specified class. Commission decisions which set aside an
assessment of an electric company's

3, and in such case the debt is limited to
2% of the taxable property within the
county, Utah Const. Article XIV, Section
4
II, as alleged, koiiittoti'i* slate-assessed
mining properties are under-assessed, then
the County "suffers] some distinct and
palpable injury that gives [it] a personal
stake" in the assessed value of stateassessed properties. The assessment determines in part the tax base of both the
County and the taxing districts within the
County, to whom the county treasurer
owes a fiduciary duty. See Board of
Education of Granite School District v.
Salt Lake County, Utah, 659 P.2d 1030
(1983). If the value of state-assessed properties is underassessed, the mill levy and
debt limitations on the County could well
prevent the County from raising adequate
revenues to perform its statutorily established responsibilities.
This Court has heard and disposed of
numerous cases where counties have challenged Tax Commission assessments, apportionments, and other actions by the Tax
Commission. See Washington County v.
State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133
P.2d 564 (1943); Kane County Board of
Equalization v. State Tax Commission, 88
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418 (1935); Rich
County v. Bailey, 47 Utah 378, 154 P
773 (1916); Juab County v. Bailey, 44
Utah 377f 140 P. 764 (1914); Salt Lake
(bounty v. Srafe Board of Equalization,
18 Utah 172, 55 P. 378 (1898). Although
the standing issue was not explicitly
raised in these cases, they implicitly
recognize that counties have standing to
challenge determinations by the Tax
Commission that directly affect the
counties' budgeting and taxing functions.
Furthermore, the second step of the
standing test would also give the county
standing in this case. If counties do not
have standing to challenge underassessments of state-assessed properties, then underassessments could be effectively insulated
from challenges, which would not likely
be made by either a state-assessed
property owner, by the Tax Commission
(which made the underassessment), oi b\
any county-assessed taxpayer.2
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equipment by- Kane—County v The electric
company argued^-that' the decision of the
Tax Commission' was not reviewable
because a, stature provided that Tax
Commission decisions were1 final. We
rejected that argument and issued the writ
of certiorari, under the predecessor to our
current Rule 653(b)(2), which provided
for a writ of certiorari where an inferior
tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.* In this case, the County's first crossclaim against the Tax Commission alleges
that U.C.A., 1953, section 59-5-57,
which assesses metalliferous mines and
mining claims at a fiat rate of $10 per
acre plus two times the net annual
proceeds for the three preceding calendar
years, is unconstitutional because it does
not assess mining properties at their full
cash value, in violation of Article XIII,
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. The
cross-claim further alleges that the Tax
Commission's methods for valuing Kennecott's personal property also do not reflect
its full cash value. Therefore, the County
is entitled to seek judicial review of these
issues. Similarly, the County's counterclaim alleges that several of the Tax Commission's methods of valuation,see note 1,
supra, result in a value substantially less
than full cash value, and therefore the
County is also entitled to judicial review
of its counterclaim.
Furthermore, the ca^es cited by the Tax
Commission and Kennecott to support
their argument are distinguishable from
this case on the basis of procedural
posture. In this case, Kennecott itself
complained that the 20fa reduction of
county-assessed property values had unlawfully increased Kennecott's tax burden,
and the County responded by a counterclaim and cross-claim challenging the
valuation of Kennecott's properties. On
general equitable principles, Kennecott is
in no position to ask a court to adjudicate the allegation that its taxes are too
high and then claim that the court cannot
adjudicate the allegation that the
valuation of Kennecott's property is too
low because of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. By alleging underassessment
of locally assessed properties, Kennecott
put the valuation of its own stateassessed properties at issue. -Rio Algom
Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681
P.2d 184 (1984).3 Accordingly, Salt Lake
County was entitled to raise the issue of
the valuation of Kennecott's property.
In contrast to this case, the cases cited
by the Tax Commission and Kennecott
are distinguishable because they involve
direct challenges to or appeals from assessments, not counterclaims or cross-claims

against a- state-assessed taxpayer of a systematic underassessment based on a constitutionally challenged statute, especially
when that taxpayer has directly challenged
the valuation of county-assessed properties in an effort to reduce its own tax liability.
The Tax Commission argues that the
County cannot sue the State Tax Commission or challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute unless that power is specifically enumerated in the County's grant of
powers. However, we have held that
section 17-4-3(1) grants the counties
power to "sue and be sued/ where they
may, under other applicable statutes or
principles, properly sue or be sued. Shaw
v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 53,
224 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1950). Part I, supra
, demonstrates that applicable legal principles properly allow the tounty the right to
sue under the facts of this case.4
The Tax Commission also argues that
the County's cross-claim was not timely
filed. Its sole legal support, Juab County
v. Bailey, 44 Utah 377, 140 P. 764
(1914), is distinguishable because, again,
it involves an initial challenge to a state
assessment, not a counterclaim or crossclaim.

in.
Kennecott argues that even if the
County has standing to bring its counterclaim, the tax division of the district court
has no authority to .grant the County's
prayer that the court value Kennecott's
properties as of 1981. Kennecott argues
that since the Tax Commission's power to
assess mines originates in the Utah Constitution Article XIII, Ssction 11, the Legislature cannot diminish that power by
allowing the courts to adjust mining assessments.
We agree. Article XIII, Section 11,
provides for creation of the Tax Commission and provides that the Tax Commission shall "assess mines and public utilities.* In State ex reL Public Service Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 95 Utah
84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938), we held that
Article XIII, Section 11, limits the Legislature's power to confer the power of assessment on any other governmental entity.
In that case, we struck down a statutory
scheme which effectively removed from
the Tax Commission the function of
assessing utilities and assigned that
function to the Pubhc Service Commission. We stated:'
Constitutional provisions* must be
considered as limitations on legislative power where there is language

For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of tab k*ae.
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of limitation or exception. ... The
provisions of section 11 [of article
XIII] specifically vest the power of
assessing utilities in the State Tax
Commission. Therefore, that
specific provision must be considered as a limitation on the power
of the legislature to place the
assessing power in any other
officer or commission.
95 Utah 111-12, 75 P.2d at 38. Accord
National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 52, 102
P.2d 508, 514 (1940).
Accordingly, the Legislature is without
power to confer the power of assessing
mines, which includes fixing valuation of
mining property, on the tax division of
the- district courts. 'The statutory scheme
establishing the tax divisions <4o&£#*foLt
^wevei'r^iirporr' 1 ^
only that the tax division may ^review decisions, determinations, and orders of the
Tax Commission, section 59-24-3 (Supp.
1983), an3 may 'affirm, reverse, modify"
or remand any order of the state Tax"
commission, and shall grant other relief,
invoke such other remedies, and issue
'such orders ... as shall be appropriate.^
Section 59-24-4 (Supp. 1983).n The reasonable implication of these sections and, in
view of Southern Pacific Co., supra, the
only constitutionally permissible interpretation, is that in challenges to mining assessments, if the tax division of a district
court finds a Tax Commission order in
error, the tax division of the court may
only reverse and remand the matter to
the Commission for a proper determination pursuant to correct legal standards.
The County argues that a contrary result
is mandated by subsections 59-24-3(1) &
(2), which in certain cases provide for a
trial de novo or an original proceeding in
equity before the tax division. We
disagree that the only reasonable interpretation of this provision is that power is
delegated to the tax division to revalue or
reassess property, and in any event,
Southern Pacific Co. precludes such a delegation of power.

rv.
Finally, the County argues that the
district court erred in dismissing its
second cross-claim, which prayed for an
order directing the Tax Commission to
make available to the County information
concerning the valuation and assessment
of Kennecott's properties.
After the district court filed its memorandum decision, the Legislature enacted
"An Act Relating to Property Tax Asses-
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sments; Requiring the Tax. Commission to
Furnish Information Relating to the Assessment of State Assessed Properties ... to
County Assessors.* 1983* Utah Laws ch.
276. The act amends U.C.A., 1953,
section 59-5-56, so. that...the information
upon which the assessments and apportionments of mines are calculated shall be
available for review, by a county assessor
upon request, and establishes penalties for
unlawful disclosure of confidential information. Since this case must be remanded
for further proceedings and since the
provision dealing with the disclosure of
information is procedural in nature, it
will govern the disposition of the
County's demand.
Reversed and remanded. No costs.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
1.
These reasons included (a) Kennecott's
mining claims were valued at a flat rate
per acre, irrespective of their fair cash
value; (b) the assessment of Kennecott's
minerals at two and one-half times the
net annual proceeds with loss carry
forward was an unconstitutional method
of assessment that allowed much of Kennecott's minerals to escape assessment; and
(c) the value of Kennecott's personal
property and improvements to real
property was underassessed because of
inappropriate depreciation schedules and
because historical cost less depreciation as
a methodology of appraising personal
property is in 'complete disregard* of
currently recognized valuation practices in
locally assessed personal property.
2.
This case does not present the issue
of whether individual taxpayers may
challenge the assessments of other individual taxpayers. See generally Annot,,
"Standing of One Taxpayer to Complain
of Underassessment or Nonassessment of
Property of Another for State and Local
Taxation," 9 A.L.R.4th 428 (1981).
However, even if individual taxpayers
could, in certain cases, show a sufficient
personal stake in another's state-assessed
tax assessment, challenges by counties are
a more orderly method in general for
challenging underassessments of stateassessed properties than individual taxpayer
challenges.
3.
In Rio Algom, the parties * were
situated similarly to this case: * Rio Algom
sued San Juan County, complaining that
county-assessed properties were underva-
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lued because of two allegedly unconstitutional statutory provisions, section. 59-5-4.5
and section 59*5-109. - After upholding
section 59-5-4.5- arid invalidating section
59-5-109, we remanded the case with directions that to ptove its right- to recover,
Rio Algom had r to establish (1) that the
county-assessed properties were underappraised, and (2) *the. true value of [Rio
Algom'sJ own properties/ 681 P.2d at
197.
4.
After the complaint was filed in this
case, the Legislature enacted a procedure
for counties to pursue in seeking judicial
review of Tax Commission assessments.
Sec U.C.A., 1953, section 59-7-12 (as
amended, 1983 Utah Laws ch. 278,
section 1) and section 59-24-2 (as
amended, 1983 Utah Laws ch. 278,
section 2). This case does not raise the
issue whether a county which now seeks
judicial review of a statute governing assessment of state-assessed properties or of
an actual assessment by the State Tax
Commission must first pursue in all cases
the procedural remedies provided by these
statures. See Rio Algom Corp. v. San
Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Ronald Lynn VILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20271
FILED: July 2, 1985
FOURTH DISTRICT
Hon. David Sam
ATTORNEYS:
David L. Wilkinson for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Milton T. Harman for Defendant and
Appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from the judgment on
a jury verdict convicting him of escape
from the state prison, a second degree
felony in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §768-309(1) and §76-8-309(2)(b) (1978 ed.),
and theft of a vehicle, a second degree
felony in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §766-404 and § 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (1978 ed.).

CODCCC

We affirm.
Defendant was a prisoner of the Utah
State Prison housed at the Millarc
County Jail for work release from thai
facility when he escaped in a stolet
vehicle. He was recaptured and returnee
to the county jail on April 22, 1984,
Throughout the following month hit
attorney filed a notice of appearance
made request for discovery, and filed
motions to reduce charge and sevei
counts. On May 30, 1984, defendant
delivered his "notice and request for disposition of pending charges* to the Utah
State Prison. On June 30, he filed his
motion to dismiss the action for failure
to prosecute in a timely manner. Th<
motion v as denied. Trial was held or
September 20.
The single issue before this court h
based upon defendant's claim that he wai
denied his constitutional right to a speed)
trial. Defendant maintains that the notice
of appearance filed on April 24, 1984
constituted notice provided for in sectior
77-29-1 of the Code of Crimina
Procedure and that his trial was not helc
until 150 days from the filing of thai
notice.
U.C.A., 1953, §77-29-1 (1978 ed.
reads:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving
a term of imprisonment in the
state prison, jail or other penal or
correctional institution of this
state, and there is pending against
the prisoner in this state any
untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to
the warden, sheriff or custodial
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of
the charge and the court wherein
it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he
shall be entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120
days of the date of delivery of
written notice.
The purpose of the statute is to protec
the constitutional right of prisoners to J
speedy trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to promptly prosecute
charges against prisoners. State v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v.
Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158
(1969) (stating the same purpose under
former statute). This statutory scheme
represents a legislative expression of the
time limits that constitute at speedy public
trial under the Utah Constitution. State

For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second

sectioa of tbis issue.
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FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Ronald W. D I E T R I C H and Mrs. Ronald W
Dietrich, Defendants,
v.
GREYHOUND BUS LINES, Garnishee
and Respondent.
No. 11961.

judgment against defendant was error,
where summons served on defendant had
not been timely issued.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 28, 1970.

Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.

f Action for merchandise sold to deenftants. The I h j j d ^ I ^ t n c l ^ C p u r t x Salt
^ike County, Merrill C. Faux, J., granted
garnishee's motion to quash writ of garlishment and set aside default judgment
entered against defendants, and plaintiff
ippealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett,
[., held that where summons dated April
[,.1969, was not in fact issued until Sep:ember 24, 1969, court failed to obtain
jurisdiction of. defendants through such
summonsjfand entry of default judgment
igainst defendants was improper.
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Judgment C=sl7(9)
Process C^2l

Where summons dated April I, 1969,
was not in fact issued until September 24,
1969, court failed to obtain jurisdiction
of defendants through such summons, and
entry of default judgment against defendants was improper. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4(b).
2. Appearance <S=>8(3)
Judgment <^99, 106(1)

Letter which defendant wrote to plaintiff's counsel, with copy addressed to county clerk, and in which defendant denied
owing bill sued \ipon and stated that if any
further proceedings were had, defendant's
attorney would handle matter did not con-

3. Garnishment <£»I24

Garnishee, to avoid risk of having to
pay twice, had right to attack default judgment entered against defendant to whom
garnishee was indebted.

James L. Wilde, Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for Greyhound
Bus Lines, garnishee and respondent.
T U C K E T T , Justice:
The plaintiff commenced this action to
recover for goods, wares and merchandise
it claims were purchased by the defendants. The complaint was filed on February
21, 1969, and the plaintiff procured the
issuance of a writ of garnishment on the
same day. At the time of filing the complaint the defendants were residents of the
State of California.
A summons which
was dated April 1, 1969, was forwarded
to the sheriff of San Mateo County, California, for service upon the defendants.
. T h e summons was received by the sheriff
on September 22, 1969, and was served on
September 24, 1969, upon the defendant
Ronald W. Dietrich.
Prior to the service of the summons upon
the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich a copy
of the summons together with a copy of
the complaint was forwarded to Western
Greyhound Lines, the defendant's employer.
The defendant Ronald W. Dietrich on
September 30, 1969, wrote a letter to counsel for the plaintiff with a copy addressed
to the County Clerk of Salt Lake County,
wherein he denied owing the bill sued upon,
and also stated that if any further proceedings were had the defendant's attorney
would handle the matter. A copy of the
letter was filed by plaintiff's counsel on

of the same constituted a general appearance on behalf of said defendant.
The
garnishee had answered that it was indebted to the defendant in the sum of
$248.96, which answer was dated on February 28, 1969.

0

%

r- %

[1-3] At the instance of the plaintiff
a default judgment was entered against
the defendants on October 27, 1969.
Thereafter the plaintiff moved the court
for the entry of judgment against the
garnishee, which motion was noticed up
for Rearing by the court. The garnishee
appeared and moved the court to quash
and set aside the writ of garnishment. The
garnishee also moved to set aside the default judgment entered against the defendants. By an order dated December 4, 1969,
the court granted the motion of the garnishee and quashed the writ of garnishment and also set aside the default judgment entered against the defendants. It is
quite apparent from the examination of
the file that the court failed to obtain
jurisdiction over the defendants. While
the summons was dated by plaintiff's counsel on April 1, 1969, the same was not in
fact issued for more than six months thereafter. Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides that a summons shall
be deemed to have issued when placed in
the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. It is quite apparent that
the summons served upon the defendant
Ronald W. Dietrich was not timely issued. 1
To avoid the risk of having to pay twice
the garnishee had the right to attack the
default judgment entered against the defendants. 2 The claim of the plaintiff that
the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich made a
general appearance by the filing of his
letter above referred to is without merit.
In any event, if it were to be construed as
a general appearance the entry of judgment by default was erroneous.

CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER
aind H E N R I O D , JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , Justice (dissenting):
I dissent. This action was for the. <^>\.
lection of an account due for merchandise
sold to the defendants. It was commenced
by the filing of a complaint, and at the
same time a writ of garnishment was
served upon Greyhound Bus Lines, the
employer of Ronald W. Dietrich. Sufficient money was attached to pay the debt.
The summons was not issued within three
months following the filing of the complaint as required by Rule 4(b), U.R.C.P.
However, in my opinion Mr. Dietrich made
a general appearance in this case on February 27, 1969, when he filed a claim of
exemption and motion to set aside the execution of attachment of wages. Mrs.
Ronald W. Dietrich never made an appearance in this matter, and so she is not
before the court.
The cases hold that an attack can be
rnade upon the vaVidity oi a garnishment
without making a general appearance, but
the defendant here did not claim that the
attachment was void. He acknowledged
its validity and moved the court to release
all of the funds upon the ground that his
earnings were only $800 per month and his
living expenses amounted to $845.40 per
month. By asking for affirmative relief,
he made a general appearance, and no summons was required to bring him before
the court. The law is set forth in 5 Am.
Jur.2d, Appearance § 21, as follows:
A general appearance is ordinarily effected by the making of any motion
* * * based wholly or in part on nonjurisdictional grounds. * * *
Later, a summons was served upon Mr.
Dietrich containing the following required
\&Tlg\i2lgfc*.

We find no error in the decision of the
court below, and the order of the court
is affirmed. The garnishee-respondent is
entitled to costs.
I. Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon or mail to plaintiffs
attorney an answer in writing to the
2. 41 A.L.R.2d 1131.
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complaint and file a copy of said answer
with the clerk of the above-entitled court
within 20 days after service of this summons upon you. If you fail to do so,
judgment by default will be taken against
you * * *
Mr. Dietrich, following the directions in
the summons, ser /ed a document upon
plaintiff's attorney by mailing it to him and
also mailed a copy to the District Court of
Salt Lake County where the action was
pending. It is reproduced herewith. 1 As
an answer it was somewhat informal but
in my opinion satisfied the requirements of
the law as to making a general appearance
in the matter. Rule 4(b), supra, says that
the summons is to be issued within three
months. This does not necessarily mean
that there cannot be further proceedings in
the action. The defendant can breathe life
into it by voluntarily making an appearance therein. Even if the motion for release of funds had not brought the defendant into court, in my opinion the filing of
this document did. It was, therefore, error
for the plaintiff to take a default judgment
against the defendant since the answer was

filed before the default of the defendant
was entered.
However, it is not the defendant who
moved to set aside the proceedings in the
court below, nor is it he who is defending
the order made by the trial court; it is a
stranger to the main action, to wit, the garnishee. It claims standing to participate
in this matter because it does not want to
pay twice. The answer to that contention
is that if the garnishee does not want to
pay twice, it should pay the money into
court and let the defendant and the plaintiff vie for the funds.
The garnishee can have no interest in the
case as it pertains to the issues between
the parties thereto. 38 C J . S . Garnishment
§ 235. If it chose to ignore the garnishment and pay the plaintiff, it must sue the
plaintiff to recover that sum but cannot
move the court for a judgment in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff,
I would dismiss this appeal and remand
the case to the trial court for such further
proceedings as may be just and proper. I
would award costs to the appellant against
the Greyhound Bus Lines.

I. "Copy to District Court of Salt Lake County
Horace J. Knowlton
9-30-1969
Dear Sirs:
This is in answer to complaint civil No. 184947.
F i r s t : You claim that we are residents of Salt Lake County or have property in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Answer^We moved to Pacifies, Calif, on March 8, 1965 and have
been residents of Calif, since and wre have never had property in
Salt Lake County.
Second: Mr. Knowlton, I once told you that this bill was not mine. And that
the person responsible has used or signed my name, 'whichever the
case.'
R e m a r k s : Last February, 1969, you had a wage attachment against me. I
have suffered embrassment [sic], my job was jeopardized, and other
personal effects.
Xow: I had to hire an attorny [sic] to get my money that was held for this
attachment. The same Civil Xo. 184947.
Please let me know if you are going to pursue this matter, 'if s o /
I will let my attorny [sic] handle it. My compensation for this
matter may be expensive.
4 c. c.
Ronald W. Dietrich"

£
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These actions seem to be maintained upon the theory that directors are trustees
for creditors, but generally these cases
have some element of fraud and deceit
involved therein. * * *
See also cases cited in the annotation at
50 A.L.R. .462.
We think the trial court correctly held
that the second amended complaint did not
state a cause of action against the individual defendants, the judgment is affirmed
with costs to the respondents.
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT,
HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

not have been made upon designated process agent nor show that station operator
came within statutory class of persons authorized to receive service of process for
lessor, default judgment against lessor was
void.
Affirmed, except for award of attorneys* fees.
1. Process <§»4

Service of summons in conformance
with mode prescribed by statute is jurisdictional, for it is the service of process, not
actual knowledge of commencement of action, which confers jurisdiction.
2. Process <§=*4

KEY NOMBtB SYSTEM

2>

26 Utah 2d 22
Peter B. MURDOCK and Anthony J. Butkovieh, dba P & B Oil Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Richard L. BLAKE, dba Wendover Richfield;
and Atlantic Richfield Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 12195.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 8, 1971.

Proper issuance and service of summons is means of invoking jurisdiction of
court and of acquiring jurisdiction over
defendant and such cannot be supplanted
by mere notice by letter, telephone or any
other such means.
3. Corporations <£»668(4)
Judgment <£=>141

Where service was not made on foreign corporation's designated process agent
as provided by law, even if corporation
had actual knowledge of the action, court
did not have jurisdiction over corporation
which was entitled to have default judgment entered against it vacated. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 4(e) (4), 41(b).
4. Process <§=>74, 135

Lessor, which had obtained quashal of
service of summons on it in action based
on "insufficient funds" checks given by operator of leased gasoline service station
and declaration that judgment against it
was void moved for judgment on counterclaim for value of property sold on execution. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., granted motion
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where return of officer making service upon station
operator as agent of lessor, a foreign corporation, which had qualified to do business in Utah and had a designated process
agent, did not indicate that service could

Under rule providing system of classification whereby service is to be upon one
group primarily with right to serve others
as secondary mode, to justify service upon
member of inferior class, it must be shown
that service upon member of superior
class cannot be had and if person served
was member of secondary class, return
must sufficiently show facts which warrant
service upon him. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4(e) (4).
5. Judgment C=I7(9)

Where return of officer making service upon alleged agent of foreign corporation, which had qualified to do business in
Utah and had a designated process agent,
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did not indicate that service could not have
been made upon designated process agent
nor show that person served came within
statutory class of persons authorized to receive service of process, default judgment
against foreign corporation was void for
lack of proper service, even though plaintiff^ counsel may have received misinformation from office of Secretary of State
to effect that corporation was not qualified
to do business in the state. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 4(e) (4).
6. Judgment <§=>40l
After judgment for plaintiff is vacated, plaintiff stands in position of trustee of
defendant of the property obtained under
the judgment and restitution may be
sought in the same or an independent action.
7. Secured Transactions <§=sl6l
In all security interests, debtor's interest m collateral remains subject to claims
of creditors who take appropriate action.
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).
8. Secured Transactions <§=o|38, 168
Security agreement creates in favor of
secured party a lien entitled to priority
over rights of unsecured creditors, but collateral may still be sold by execution creditor subject to interest of the secured party.
^.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).

70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).
11. Secured Transactions <§=»228
On default, secured party is entitled to
possession as against a subsequent levying
creditor, for levy cannot void secured party's right to repossession.
U.C.A.1953,
70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 70A-9-503;
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8 ( d ) .
12. Pleading <§=>I82
Allegations in counterclaim not responded to are deemed admitted. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 8 ( d ) .
13. Secured Transactions <§=>I70, 228
Where, at time suppliers of gasoline
service station obtained default judgment
against operator of station on basis of operator's giving supplier's checks returned
marked "insufficient funds", operator had
been in default to lessor oil company which
had security interest in tools, equipment,
inventory and proceeds therefrom, oil company was entitled to possession of collateral and to recover from suppliers its value
at time of sheriff's sale rather than proceeds of the sale. U.C.A. 1953, 70A-9-306,
70A-9-503.
14. Secured Transactions <§=>I7I
One who has possession or immediate
right to possession, such as chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after default, may
maintain action for conversion against one
who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over property.

9

- Secured Transactions <§=>228
Most important remedy available to seCUr
ed party is right to take possession of
collateral following a debtor's default. U.
^•A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311,
^-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
8(d).
°" Secured Transactions <§»222, 237
After default, debtor has lost his right
Possession in property subject to securiln
terest and retains only contingent
ri
ght
s in the surplus, if any, after sale. U.

15. Trover and Conversion <§=^46
Ordinarily, where there has been a
conversion, and property is not returned,
measure of damages is value of property at
time of the conversion.

Parker M. Nielson, LaMar Duncan, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Allen H. Tibbals, of Boyden, Tibbals &
Staten, Salt Lake City, for defendants and
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs commenced the initial phase of
this case in March of 1969, when they filed
an action against Richard Blake and Atlantic Richfield Company, alleging that
Blake was the agent and operator of a
service station in Wendover, Utah, which
was owned and leased by Atlantic. Plaintiffs then alleged that on three separate occasions, Blake, in the course of his employment, purchased merchandise for which he
gave checks to plaintiffs, which were returned to plaintiffs and marked "Insufficient Funds/' Plaintiffs prayed for judgment against the defendants for $2,551.98
in their first cause of action, and for $2,652.89 in the second and third causes of
action.
Service of summons was made upon
Blake by serving him personally, and service upon Atlantic was made by delivering
the summons and complaint to "Richard L.
Blake, agent." On April 28, 1969, plaintiffs had a default judgment entered
against both defendants. Plaintiffs subsequently brought a supplemental proceeding
against Blake, and in May 1969, they entered into a stipulation with Blake which
provided a schedule of payments. Evidently, Blake did not make the payments, and,
thereafter, plaintiffs caused an undated execution to be issued on the judgment. A
sheriff's sale upon the personal property
located in the service station was set for
the 24th of September, 1969. Atlantic
learned of this proposed sale and through
its credit manager notified plaintiffs' attorney that Atlantic claimed a security interest in the property. Included with the letter were copies of all the documents which
indicated that Atlantic had a perfected security interest in all the tools and service
station equipment and inventory, and proceeds therefrom. The security agreement
had been executed November 14, 1968, to
secure payment of a promissory note executed by Blake on September 16, 1968, for
the sum of $8,781.19. A financing statement was filed in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code in the office of the

Secretary of State. Plaintiffs' attorney
was admonished that legal action would be
taken if the seizure and sale of the assets
of the service station were consummated
Nevertheless, the sale was held, at which
time three parties paid cash in the sum of
$1,290.03; and plaintiff, Butkovich, purchased the remainder for $1,531.60, which
was applied against the judgment.
Subsequently, Atlantic filed a motion to
vacate the judgment and to quash the service of summons. Atlantic alleged that
service of summons upon it, a foreign corporation, had not been in accordance with
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P. Atlantic pleaded that
it was a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified
to do business in Utah, and that at all
times pertinent to this action it had on file
with the Secretary of State a designated
resident agent qualified to receive service
of process, namely, the C. T. Corporation
System at 175 South Main Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah. The pleading stated that
no process at any time was served upon
this designated agent. Atlantic concluded
that the service was defective and no jurisdiction wras acquired; and, therefore, the
judgment should be set aside and the parties restored to their prior status. Plaintiffs' response thereto asserted that Atlantic was aware of the action, and that plaintiffs' counsel had inquired at the office of
the Secretary of State and been informed
that Atlantic was not qualified to do business in the state of Utah, and, therefore, at
the time of service of process, Blake was
the only agent having control of the assets
of the corporation within the state.
A hearing was held, and the trial court
entered an order quashing the service of
summons on the ground Blake was not an
agent of Atlantic within the meaning of
Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and therefore,
service upon him was insufficient to bring
Atlantic within the jurisdiction of the
court. The judgment against Atlantic was
declared void and vacated.
Thereafter, defendant Atlantic filed a
motion for restitution, wherein Atlantic alleged that its property, having a market
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/ ci 04? 88, was sold at the sheriffs
Accompanying the motion was an af*daut oi Atlantic's regional credit mana11, .tcmizing the property and its value,
pontiffs have never controverted this affidavit. Subsequently, plaintiffs properly
jrrvcd Atlantic and then responded to the
motion for restitution by claiming that the
usucs raised m the complaint would determrc the true ownership of the property
claimed by Atlantic. The trial court entered an order requiring plaintiffs to pay
:nto court the sum of $4,942.88, the value
of the property sold, to be held by the
clerk, subject to the order of the court as
to the ultimate disposition thereof, based
upon a determination of the right thereto
as between plaintiffs and Atlantic. Defendant Atlantic filed an answer, counterclaim, and a cross-claim against Blake.
Plaintiffs filed a reply to the counterclaim,
and an appeal to this court, which was dismissed as premature; the case was remanded to the trial court.
]c

Plaintiffs took no further action to comply with the order of the court; so Atlantic filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
•11(b), U.R.C.P., and for judgment on its
counterclaim for the value of the property
sold on execution under the void judgment.
The trial court granted judgment in accordance with the motion; plaintiffs appeal therefrom.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court
er
red m vacating the default judgment entered against defendant Atlantic, because
Atlantic had actual knowledge of the actl0
n- Plaintiffs argue that although serv,ce
was not made on Atlantic's designated
P^cess agent, as provided by law, Atlantic
as aware of the impending sheriff's sale
and
contacted plaintiffs' attorney prior to
the
date upon which it was held.
Atlantic urges that strict compliance
h Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., is necessary
a
cquire jurisdiction over the corporation

NSlt

'• Sternbeek v. Buck, 148 Cal.App.2d 829,
S0? P.2d 970, 972 (1957) ; Tropic Builders
- Ltd. v. Naval Ammunition Depot,
48
Haw. 306, 402 P.2d 440, 448 (1965).

and that service upon Blake was not in
conformity therewith, and was, therefore,
insufficient;
the trial court properly
quashed the service of summons and declared the judgment against Atlantic void
[1-3] Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service oi
process, not actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could
never object to the sufficiency of service
of process, since he must have knowledge
of the suit to make such objection. 1 The
proper issuance and service of summons is
the means of invoking the jurisdiction oi
the court and of acquiring jurisdictior
over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone
*or any other such means. 2 _ ^ --- '
Plaintiffs further assert that service
upon Blake was sufficient under Rule 4(e)
(4), U.R.C.P., to acquire jurisdiction over
Atlantic because Blake was an agent who
had the management and control over
property to which Atlantic claims a right
of possession.
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P , provides:
Personal service within the state shall
be as follows:
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein
otherwise provided for, * * * by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a
managing or general agent, or to any
other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process
and, if the agent is one authorized by
statute to receive service and the statute
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant. If no such officer or agent
can be found in the county in which the
action is brought, then upon any such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier,
managing agent, chief clerk, or other
2. Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 409, 410, 402
P.2d 703 (1965).
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agent having the management, direction
or control of any property of such corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the state. If no
such officer or agent can be found in
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an
officer or place of business in this state,
or does business in this state, then upon
the person doing such business or in
charge of such office or place of business.
The evidence established that Atlantic
had been qualified to do business in the
state of Utah, that it was in good standing,
and that it had a designated process agent.
[4] Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., provides a
system of classification whereby service **
to be upon one group primarily with a
right to serve others as a secondary mode.
In order to justify service upon a member
of an inferior class under Rule 4(e) (4),
U.R.C.P., it must be shown that service
upon a member of the superior classes cannot be had. If the person served wras a
member of the secondary class, the return
must sufficiently show the facts which
warrant service on him. 3
[5] In the instant action, Atlantic's designated agent, C. T. Corporation, was a
member of the primary class, and Blake,
even under plaintiffs' theory, was a member of an inferior class. Furthermore, the
return of the officer making the service
neither indicated that service could not be
made upon some member in the superior
class, nor did it show by proper description
that the person served came within an inferior class. The affidavit of plaintiffs'
counsel during the proceeding to quash the
service does not cure the defect; the fact
that counsel may have received misinformation from the office of the Secretary of
State does not dispense with compliance
3. Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1. 94
P.2tl 858 (1939) ; Boston Acme Mines
Development Co. v. Clawson, 6Q Utah
103, 123, 124, 127, 240 P. 165 (1925) ;
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident
Insurance Co., 191 F.Supp. 174, 170
(USDCDUtah, 1960).

with "Ru'ie 4(e) (4), \3."R.C.?., which is I 0r .
mulated in mandatory terms. The judg.
ment against Atlantic was void for lack of
proper service.
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial
court improperly granted an order for restitution, and, furthermore, plaintiffs should
be compelled to restore only $2,821.63, the
sum for which the property was sold at the
sheriff's sale. Plaintiffs also challenge the
court's award of attorneys' fees.
[6] In Levy v. Drew, 4 the court held
that where a judgment has been vacated by
a trial court, the defendant is entitled to
restitution of all things taken from him under the judgment. After the judgment is
vacated, the plaintiff stands in the position
of a trustee of defendant of the property
obtained under the judgment. Restitution
may be sought in the same or an independent action. 5
Atlantic was a secured party and Blake
was a debtor under a security agreement,
and the issues of the instant action must be
determined in accordance with the Commercial Code, Title 70A, U.C.A.1953, as
amended 1965.
70A-9-311, U.C.A.1953,
1965, provides:

as

amendec

The debtor's rights in collateral ma]
be voluntarily or involuntarily trans
ferred (by way of sale, creation of a se
curity interest, attachment, levy, garnish
ment or other judicial process) notwith
standing a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer o
making the transfer constitute a default
[7,8] The official comments to th<
code indicate that the purpose of Sectioi
9-311 is to provide without equivocatio:
that in all security interests the debtor's in
terest in the collateral remains subject t<
claims of creditors who take appropriat
4. 4 Cal.2d 456, 50 P.2d 435, 101 A.L.R.
1144 (1935).
5. Also see Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d
404, 409, 285 P.2d 839 (1955); 46 Am.
Jur.2d, Judgments, § 788, p. 949.
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i The security agreement creates in
secured party a lien on the
Uxor of the
ed which is entitled to priorcr the rights of unsecured creditors,
^ " docs not exempt the collateral from
^
judicial sale. The collateral may
^M be sold by an execution creditor sub^ to the interest of the secured party. 7
' Section 70A-9-311 must be construed in
8
which proIt v. of Section 70A-9-503,
noV>

Unless otherwise agreed a secured
pat> has on default the right to take
po^cssion of the collateral. In taking
possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be
done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action * * *
[9-11] The most important remedy
available to a secured party is the right to
take possession of the collateral following
a debtor's default.9 After default the debtor has lost his right of possession and sale
and retains only a contingent right in the
surplus, if any, after sale. On default, a
secured party is entitled to possession as
against a subsequent levying creditor, for a
levy cannot void the secured party's right
to repossession.10
[12] In the instant action, Atlantic al£ed in its pleadings that the debtor,
Blake, had been in default in payment of
his promissory note; that no payment of
an\ kind had been made on the obligation
since April of 1969, and that by reason of
his default, Atlantic was entitled to possession of the collateral described in the se,e

6

. F l r s t National Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff of Milwaukee Countv, 34 Wis.2d 535,
149 XW.2U 54S (1967).

7

;^J tec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc.,
(Fla.App.1967) 204 So.2d 740.
8
- Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa.
Dls
t. & Co.2<l 637 (1907).
9

* var P Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Savings
Loan Assn. of Shamokin, Penn., (Penn.
Sup.CU970) 271 A.2d 493.
'0- Platte Valley Bank of North Bend v.
krac], 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724
(1970) ; William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess
&

«84P2d-in/2

curity agreement. These allegations were
incorporated in Atlantic's counterclaim
against plaintiffs, and, since plaintiffs did
not respond thereto, they are deemed admitted under Rule 8(d), U.R.C.P.
[13] Since Blake was in default at the
time plaintiffs received the default judgment, Atlantic was entitled to possession of
the collateral at that time, both by virtue
of the express provisions of the security
agreement and by 70A-9-503. In other
words, the right to possession and sale of
the collateral passed from the debtor,
Blake, to the secured party, Atlantic, at the
time of default, and these are the rights to
which Atlantic was entitled to be restored.
[14] One who has possession or an immediate right to possession, such as a chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after
default, may maintain an action for conversion against one who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the property of another in exclusion or denial of
his rights or inconsistent therewith. 1 1 The
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 128,
p. 156, provides:
A person who has tortiously obtained,
retained, used, or disposed of the chattels
of another, is under a duty of restitution
to the other. 12
[15] Ordinarily, where there has been
a conversion, and the property is not returned, the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of the
conversion. 13 The affidavit, submitted by
Atlantic as to the value of the property at
the time of the sheriff's sale has not been
& Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc.2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.
2d 659 (1967).
11. First National Bank of Bay Shore v.
Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d
162 (1966).
12. Also see § 131, Illustration 3, p. 544.
13. Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 419, 426,
135 P. 112 (1913) ; Clarke Floor Machine Div. of Studebaker Corp. v. Gordon
(Maryland 1970), 7 U.C.C.Reptr.Serv.
363; Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (Colo.1970) 472
P.2d 761.

•*,»,»averted by plaintiffs; so Atlantic is entitled to that amount rather than the proceeds of the sale as urged by plaintiffs. 14
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except for the award of attorneys'
fees, which was predicated on a provision
in the security agreement to which plaintiffs were not parties. Costs are awarded
to defendant, Atlantic Richfield Company.
T U C K E T T , H E N R I O D , E L L E T T , and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
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JOHN DEERE COMPANY OF MOLINE,
a corporation, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Harold BEHLING and Jean Behlfng, copartners, etc., Defendants and
No. 12205.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 19, 1971.
Plaintiff brought suit to recover as assignee of note and security agreement by
wfhich defendants had purchased farm machinery from assignor. The 7th District
Court, Emery County, Henry Ruggeri, J.,
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that evidence that there
was no claim in writing that some of purchased farm equipment had failed to work
until 23 months after transaction, a few
days before first major installment payment was due, supported finding that assignee of note and security agreement was
holder in due course and entitled to recover against defendants.
Affirmed except as to award of attorney's fees.
14. It should be emphasized that Atlantic
was entitled to possession based on
Blake's default; if Blake had not been

1. Bills and Notes <S=497(I), 525
Where execution of note and securiw "
agreement by which defendants had p ^
chased farm machinery and assignment of
them to plaintiff was admitted, it v,-^ ^
ma facie established that plaintiff ^ '
holder m due course and entitled to recover and defendants had burden of prov
ing that plaintiff was not holder in due
course and other affirmative defenses. Ut
CA.1953, 70A-3-307.
2. Sales <S=288(I)
Absent persuasive reason for avoiding
waiver of defense clause, warnings in documents by which defendants had purchased
farm machinery that defendants agreed
that defenses or breaches of warranty
could not be asserted against third persons
would be given effect. U.C.A.1953, 70A9-206.
3. Bills and Notes <&=>525
Evidence that there was no claim in
writing that some of purchased farm
equipment had failed to work until 23
months after transaction, a few days before first major installment payment was
due, supported finding that assignee of
note and security agreement was holder in
due course and entitled to recover against
defendants. U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-307.
4. Secured Transactions <§=»226
In suit to recover as assignee of note
and security agreement, where there was
no evidence in record upon which to base
award of attorney's fees, plaintiff was not
entitled to such award.

Stanley V. Litizzette, Helper, E. J.
Skeen, R. C. Skeen, of Skeen & Skeen,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
S. J. Sweetring, Price, for plaintiff and
respondent.
in default, Atlantic would merely be
entitled to assert its priority and right
to the proceeds. § 70A-9-306,
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